content-calendar

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the Bash tool to perform file operations, including searching for entries, validating file headers, and performing date-based logic using grep, awk, and date utilities. These commands are primarily used to maintain the content-calendar.md file as the single source of truth.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute specific local Python scripts: scripts/video-transcript.py (which takes a user-supplied URL as an argument) and ~/private-skills/scripts/scan-negative-framing.py. Additionally, python3 -c is used for inline date arithmetic. These executions rely on the presence of local environment scripts which are not included in the skill package itself.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external and potentially untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the content-calendar.md file (which may be manually modified), processes user-provided articles/transcripts, and ingests content from external video URLs.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating external content into the model's context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash and Write tools, enabling it to execute shell commands and modify local files based on its instructions.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the external content before it is used to influence the agent's content creation or pipeline management tasks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 03:45 PM