content-calendar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
Bashtool to perform file operations, including searching for entries, validating file headers, and performing date-based logic usinggrep,awk, anddateutilities. These commands are primarily used to maintain thecontent-calendar.mdfile as the single source of truth. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute specific local Python scripts:
scripts/video-transcript.py(which takes a user-supplied URL as an argument) and~/private-skills/scripts/scan-negative-framing.py. Additionally,python3 -cis used for inline date arithmetic. These executions rely on the presence of local environment scripts which are not included in the skill package itself. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external and potentially untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads the
content-calendar.mdfile (which may be manually modified), processes user-provided articles/transcripts, and ingests content from external video URLs. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating external content into the model's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
BashandWritetools, enabling it to execute shell commands and modify local files based on its instructions. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or validating the external content before it is used to influence the agent's content creation or pipeline management tasks.
Audit Metadata