feature-lifecycle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from architectural handoffs and dormant metadata seeds to influence the design and planning phases.
- Ingestion points: The
references/design.mdfile reads JSON data from theadr/handoffs/directory and trigger conditions from.seeds/index.json. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes an external validator (
scripts/handoff.py) to check for absolute paths, traversal, shell metacharacters, and symlink escapes before adoption. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool for command execution, theAgenttool for sub-task dispatch, and can write to the repository using therepository_artifact.pyutility. - Sanitization: Path and metadata validation is performed at the boundary, though the validated content is directly interpolated into subsequent prompt contexts to drive the design dialogue.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell redirection and heredocs to pass dynamically generated content to local scripts for processing and writing.
- Evidence:
references/design.mdpipes LLM-generated Architectural Decision Record (ADR) content intopython3 scripts/repository_artifact.py writeusing a heredoc (<<'ADR'). - Context: This is used to persist design decisions to the repository. The skill relies on local scripts to handle the security of the write operations (atomic replaces, fsyncs, and path containment).
Audit Metadata