html-artifact
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdfor Phase 1 direct the agent to run the commandpython3 skills/meta/html-artifact/scripts/detect-shape.py --request "{user_request}". Because the{user_request}variable is not sanitized before being passed to the shell, it allows an attacker to perform command injection by including characters like;,&, or`in their prompt. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamic module loading is used across multiple files including
scripts/validate-artifact.pyand several scripts inscripts/tests/viaimportlib.import_module(). This technique allows for the execution of code from computed paths at runtime. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/render-github-issues.pyscript accesses private user information via theghCLI, including GitHub issues and comments. While functional, this represents a significant data exposure surface as the sensitive information is then placed into HTML files that could be exfiltrated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data via the
{user_request}variable inSKILL.mdanddetect-shape.pywithout boundary markers or sanitization. The agent has capabilities like subprocess execution and file writing, which could be abused if the agent follows instructions hidden within the user-provided data. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and suggests the installation of external Python packages like
playwrightandpython-pptxto support PDF and PPTX export features.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata