kubernetes
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to ingest and analyze untrusted data from the Kubernetes environment (logs, events, pod descriptions) using commands like
kubectl logsandkubectl get events. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious content in logs could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Diagnostic data is fetched from the cluster via
kubectl logs <pod> --previous,kubectl describe pod, andkubectl get eventsas described inreferences/kubernetes-debugging.mdandreferences/crash-diagnosis.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use specific delimiters or protective framing when the agent processes this untrusted external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to execute complex
kubectlcommands and provide configuration advice based on the ingested information. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit guidance on sanitizing or validating the content of logs and event messages before interpreting them as part of the triage process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for executing highly privileged shell commands intended for deep system troubleshooting.
- Evidence: In
references/resource-debugging.md, the skill describes usingkubectl debug nodewhich creates pods withhostPID,hostNetwork, and root access to the node's filesystem mounted at/host. - Evidence:
references/cobalt-kvm-exporter.mddetails a infrastructure DaemonSet configuration requiringrunAsUser: 0,hostPID: true, andSYS_PTRACEcapabilities.
Audit Metadata