pr-workflow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to interact with the system keychain and retrieve sensitive credentials.
- Evidence:
scripts/coordinator-validate.pyandreferences/miner.mdusesecurity find-internet-password -s github.com -wto fetch GitHub tokens in plaintext. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions that reduce security boundaries for external tools.
- Evidence:
references/codex-review-cli-patterns.mdandreferences/codex-review-invocation.mdrecommend the use of the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag with the Codex CLI tool. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic module loading to verify environment prerequisites.
- Evidence:
scripts/validate.pyutilizes the__import__function to check for the presence of thegithubpackage at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from GitHub to drive system actions.
- Ingestion points:
references/feedback.mdandreferences/fix.mdfetch comments from GitHub PR reviews and issues using theghAPI. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to edit local files, perform git commits, and push changes to remote repositories.
- Boundary markers: The skill suggests using temp files and
--body-fileflags to prevent shell mangling, but lacks explicit prompt boundary delimiters for the ingested text. - Sanitization: A manual validation phase is included where the agent is instructed to verify claims against the code before applying fixes, acting as a human-in-the-loop mitigation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on external tools and libraries that are not bundled with the skill.
- Evidence: Instructions in
references/miner.mdandscripts/validate.pyreference the installation and use of@openai/codexandPyGithub.
Audit Metadata