research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes standard shell utilities such as
wc,ls, andgrepto interact with its own logging infrastructure and verify the existence of theroute-events.jsonlfile. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.md(Phase 1) andreferences/error-handling.md, where commands likewc -l "$LOG"andls ~/.claude/hooks/are used for diagnostics. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The reference materials include Python scripts designed to be executed via
python3for parsing JSONL data to perform health checks and event counting on local logs. - Evidence:
references/error-handling.mdandreferences/preferred-patterns.mdcontain hardcoded Python scripts that are piped topython3to validate JSON consistency and count event types. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the web for fact-checking and reads log files containing user-provided snippets.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
WebFetch(external URLs),WebSearch(search results), androute-events.jsonl(containingrequest_snippetfields). - Boundary markers: The skill employs a multi-agent review pattern, using a separate dispatch for self-review (
skills/shared-patterns/report-self-review.md) to synthesize and verify synthesized findings. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses
Bash(local file diagnostics),Write(report generation),Agent(sub-task dispatch), andWebFetch/WebSearch(network access). - Sanitization: During the "EXTRACT" phase, the skill performs structured extraction of specific fields (claims, statistics, quotes) from ingested source material to isolate facts from potentially malicious prose instructions.
Audit Metadata