roast
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data from repository files and documentation to perform its analysis, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
Read,Glob, andGreptools in Phase 2 and Phase 4 to extract content from the target project files.\n - Boundary markers: The
Agent Prompt Templateinreferences/personas.mddoes not specify the use of clear delimiters or instructions to the sub-agents to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the target files.\n - Capability inventory: The agent and its sub-agents have access to tools including
Bash,Task,Read,Glob,Grep, andSkill.\n - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the content read from files before it is interpolated into the prompts for the persona sub-agents.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to perform repository surveys and logs analysis.\n - Evidence: Phase 1 and Phase 2 of
SKILL.mdinstruct the agent to execute shell commands such asls,wc,du,git status,git log, andgit diff. The skill attempts to implement guardrails by mandating the activation of aread-only-opsskill, but the core functionality still relies on shell command execution over the local environment.
Audit Metadata