skill-composer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on a multi-stage pipeline where data from one skill is captured and reused as context for subsequent steps, creating a vulnerability surface for instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: In
SKILL.md(Phase 3, Step 2), the instructions direct the agent to capture the output from a completed skill and inject it directly as context when invoking the next skill in the chain. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not require the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating captured data into new prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted access to high-capability tools, including
Bash,Task, andSkill(as specified in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter), which could be misused if an injection bypasses safety guardrails. - Sanitization: Absent. No logic is provided to validate, filter, or escape natural language instructions that might be contained within the data passed between skills.
Audit Metadata