skill-composer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture relies on a multi-stage pipeline where data from one skill is captured and reused as context for subsequent steps, creating a vulnerability surface for instruction injection.
  • Ingestion points: In SKILL.md (Phase 3, Step 2), the instructions direct the agent to capture the output from a completed skill and inject it directly as context when invoking the next skill in the chain.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not require the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating captured data into new prompts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted access to high-capability tools, including Bash, Task, and Skill (as specified in the SKILL.md frontmatter), which could be misused if an injection bypasses safety guardrails.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No logic is provided to validate, filter, or escape natural language instructions that might be contained within the data passed between skills.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 31, 2026, 03:46 PM