testing-agents-with-subagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a framework for running subagents with arbitrary test inputs. This architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in test cases could potentially override subagent behavior or safety protocols.
- Ingestion points: Test inputs are defined in Phase 1 (SKILL.md) and Phase 3 (references/examples-and-errors.md) and passed directly to subagents via the Task tool.
- Boundary markers: The dispatch templates in references/examples-and-errors.md use triple quotes (""") as delimiters for inputs, but they lack explicit instructions for the subagent to treat interpolated data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and Task (for subagent spawning).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, filtering, or sanitization of the test data before it is interpolated into subagent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute shell commands and local scripts using the Bash tool for reading agent definitions and running the evaluation harness.
- Evidence: SKILL.md contains instructions to execute
cat agents/{agent-name}.mdandcat skills/{skill-name}/SKILL.md. Additionally, references/testing-patterns.md documents the usage ofpython evals/harness.pyfor automated testing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically invokes subagents using the Task tool based on agent names that are either provided as input or discovered in the file system.
- Evidence: Instructions in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of SKILL.md utilize the Task tool with the
subagent_typeparameter set to variables such as{agent-name}, which are determined at runtime.
Audit Metadata