agentmail
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the user or agent to perform global installations of the
agentmail-clipackage usingnpm install -g. Global installations typically require elevated privileges (e.g.,sudoon Linux/macOS) and modify system-wide directories, which increases the impact if a package is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs third-party software from public registries (npm and PyPI) that are not on the whitelisted sources list. Specifically, it recommends installing
agentmail-cliand theagentmailPython SDK. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation in
references/websockets.mdsuggests a WebSocket connection URL (wss://ws.agentmail.to/v0?api_key=$AGENTMAIL_API_KEY) that passes a sensitive API key as a query parameter. This practice can expose credentials in server logs, proxy logs, and network history. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process incoming emails, which are untrusted external inputs that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points: External email data is fetched via
agentmail inboxes:messages list,agentmail inboxes:messages get, and realtime streams through Webhooks and WebSockets. - Boundary markers: The instructions suggest using
extracted_textfor LLM input but do not provide explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the email body. - Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to send emails, reply to threads, create inboxes, and execute terminal commands.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external email content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata