antigravity-cli

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the terminal tool to execute various agy commands for plugin management, binary updates, and running model prompts.
  • Evidence: Examples provided in SKILL.md show commands like agy plugin list and agy -p '...' being executed via the terminal.
  • Evidence: Mentions the use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag which bypasses internal CLI safety checks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions to download and execute installation scripts from official Google domains.
  • Evidence: references/cli-docs.md contains curl and irm commands targeting https://antigravity.google/ for script execution.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation instructions include piping remote scripts directly into shell interpreters.
  • Evidence: references/cli-docs.md describes executing installation scripts from antigravity.google using | bash and | iex.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from log files and project repositories.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads log files at ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/log/cli-*.log and processes arbitrary project files when using the agy -p command.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the documentation.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the terminal tool for executing shell commands and read_file for accessing the file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from external files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 21, 2026, 09:45 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — antigravity-cli