antigravity-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
terminaltool to execute variousagycommands for plugin management, binary updates, and running model prompts. - Evidence: Examples provided in
SKILL.mdshow commands likeagy plugin listandagy -p '...'being executed via the terminal. - Evidence: Mentions the use of the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag which bypasses internal CLI safety checks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation includes instructions to download and execute installation scripts from official Google domains.
- Evidence:
references/cli-docs.mdcontainscurlandirmcommands targetinghttps://antigravity.google/for script execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installation instructions include piping remote scripts directly into shell interpreters.
- Evidence:
references/cli-docs.mddescribes executing installation scripts fromantigravity.googleusing| bashand| iex. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from log files and project repositories.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads log files at
~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/log/cli-*.logand processes arbitrary project files when using theagy -pcommand. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
terminaltool for executing shell commands andread_filefor accessing the file system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from external files before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata