blogwatcher
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides installation instructions that involve downloading a binary and extracting it directly into a system-wide binary directory:
curl -sL [URL] | tar xz -C /usr/local/bin. This pattern lacks integrity verification, such as checksum or signature checking, which could lead to the execution of malicious code if the source repository or the connection is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads binaries and source code from
github.com/JulienTant/blogwatcher-cli. While this belongs to the skill's author, it is a personal repository not identified as a pre-verified trusted organization or well-known service. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted RSS/Atom feeds and websites via HTML scraping. This data is then presented to the agent, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in feed content.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of
blogwatcher-cli scanand site scraping results. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary instructions are used to separate untrusted feed content from other agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses subprocess execution via
blogwatcher-cliand can access URLs usingweb_extract. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation of the feed data before it is processed by the AI.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the
blogwatcher-clitool via shell commands for monitoring and managing article states.
Audit Metadata