codex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by automating code reviews and bug fixes on untrusted third-party inputs.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through cloning external git repositories (
git clone) and pulling external pull requests (gh pr checkout,git diff) inSKILL.mdunder the 'PR Reviews' and 'Parallel Issue Fixing' sections. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or clear prompt isolations implemented to prevent the underlying LLM from executing malicious commands embedded within the fetched code or PR descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
terminaltool to run administrative and development operations, including execution of thecodexCLI, file modification, and repository writes. - Sanitization: The instruction set lacks any validation, filtering, or sanitization workflows for external files prior to passing them to the execution environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the execution of shell commands through the
terminaltool that consciously lower security controls. It instructs the agent to utilize flags such as--sandbox danger-full-accessand--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxto avoid environment compatibility errors, effectively disabling the application's built-in sandbox boundaries.
Audit Metadata