docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pygenerates a C source file at runtime from a hardcoded string, compiles it into a shared object usinggcc, and then injects it into thesofficeprocess via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This technique is used to bypass system restrictions on AF_UNIX sockets in sandboxed environments but constitutes a high-risk execution pattern.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions inSKILL.mddirect the AI agent to autonomously executesudo apt installcommands to install system dependencies such aspandoc,libreoffice, andpoppler-utils. This promotes the use of root privileges without human intervention.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several skill components, includingscripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py, andscripts/office/validators/redlining.py, usesubprocess.runto execute external binary tools likesoffice,gcc, andgit.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of external software and packages vianpm install docxandpip install defusedxml lxmlto function.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied.docxfiles by unpacking and parsing their internal XML content. While the skill employs mitigations likedefusedxmland provides warnings in its documentation, the exposure of these data ingestion points to powerful system tools likesofficeandgitcreates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata