docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and process injection to maintain functionality in environments with restricted socket access.
- File:
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains logic to write C source code to a temporary file (lo_socket_shim.c), compile it into a shared object (lo_socket_shim.so) usinggcc, and then use theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library into thesofficeexecutable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts execute external binaries with varying levels of risk.
- File:
scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccfor runtime compilation. - File:
scripts/accept_changes.pyandscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesoffice(LibreOffice) to process documents. - File:
scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto compare text content. - File:
SKILL.mdprovides documentation suggesting the use ofsudo apt installfor system dependencies, which is a best practice violation in automated agent environments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted
.docxfiles. - Ingestion points:
scripts/merge_runs.py,scripts/accept_changes.py, andscripts/office/validate.pyall accept external file paths as input. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions within the skill body to ignore or isolate instructions embedded in the processed document text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file write capabilities and the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.runinsoffice.pyandaccept_changes.py. - Sanitization: The skill uses
defusedxmlto mitigate standard XML-based attacks like XXE (XML External Entity) injection, which provides a layer of data-level security.
Audit Metadata