faiss
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The LangChain integration example in
SKILL.mddemonstrates the use ofallow_dangerous_deserialization=Trueduring theFAISS.load_localoperation. This parameter allows the library to use Python'spicklemodule for loading index metadata. Loading a maliciously crafted index file from an untrusted source while this flag is enabled can lead to arbitrary code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines patterns for ingesting external data into vector indices, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the processed content contains adversarial instructions intended to influence downstream agent actions.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
FAISS.from_documentsinSKILL.mdandindex.add(vectors)inreferences/index_types.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings regarding untrusted content are present in the code snippets.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system operations for saving and loading indices (
faiss.write_index,faiss.read_index,vectorstore.save_local,vectorstore.load_local). - Sanitization: The provided examples do not include sanitization, filtering, or validation of the input documents before they are processed for embedding.
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