github

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill in references/auth.md explicitly recommends configuring the git credential helper with git config --global credential.helper store, which saves GitHub Personal Access Tokens in plaintext in the ~/.git-credentials file.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script scripts/git-credential-token.py is specifically designed to read and parse the sensitive ~/.git-credentials file to extract raw authentication tokens. This behavior is repeated in scripts/gh-env.sh and across several reference files (references/issues.md, references/pr-workflow.md, references/repo-management.md) which export these tokens to the environment for use in shell commands.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: scripts/gh-env.sh also attempts to read and extract the GITHUB_TOKEN from ~/.hermes/.env, another sensitive configuration file.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from external sources (GitHub issue and PR comments) via commands like gh issue view --comments and gh pr view --comments (documented in references/issue-to-pr.md).
  • Ingestion points: GitHub issue thread comments and pull request discussion threads.
  • Boundary markers: None; the agent is instructed to read the "live state" from these comments to guide its next actions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file writing (write_file, patch), command execution (gh, git), and network operations (curl to GitHub API).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the ingested comment data before it is used to influence the agent's logic for code modifications or repository management.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:33 PM