himalaya
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides installation instructions that use a piped shell execution pattern (
curl -sSL ... | sh). - Evidence: The installation section in
SKILL.mdsuggests fetching an installation script fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/pimalaya/himalaya/master/install.shand piping it directly tosh. While this targets the official repository for the Himalaya CLI tool, this execution pattern is inherently risky. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (emails) and possesses capabilities that could be abused if the agent follows instructions embedded within that data.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content via
himalaya message read,himalaya envelope list, andhimalaya message export(all inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to separate the email content from the agent's system instructions, increasing the risk of the agent obeying commands found within emails.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides full email management capabilities, including sending emails (
himalaya template send), deleting messages (himalaya message delete), and downloading attachments (himalaya attachment download). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or filtering the email content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various subcommands through the
himalayaCLI tool, which is the primary mechanism for its functionality.
Audit Metadata