himalaya

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides installation instructions that use a piped shell execution pattern (curl -sSL ... | sh).
  • Evidence: The installation section in SKILL.md suggests fetching an installation script from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pimalaya/himalaya/master/install.sh and piping it directly to sh. While this targets the official repository for the Himalaya CLI tool, this execution pattern is inherently risky.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (emails) and possesses capabilities that could be abused if the agent follows instructions embedded within that data.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads external content via himalaya message read, himalaya envelope list, and himalaya message export (all in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to separate the email content from the agent's system instructions, increasing the risk of the agent obeying commands found within emails.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides full email management capabilities, including sending emails (himalaya template send), deleting messages (himalaya message delete), and downloading attachments (himalaya attachment download).
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing, escaping, or filtering the email content before it is processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various subcommands through the himalaya CLI tool, which is the primary mechanism for its functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 06:32 PM