ip-as-logo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the local workspace to inform the design process.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project context from files such as
README,product docs,package or app metadata,landing-page copy,manifests, anddesign tokens. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions defining delimiters or warning the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed workspace files.
- Capability inventory: The gathered context is used to drive the
image_generatetool and potentiallydelegate_taskfor parallel candidate generation. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the content from the external repository files is described.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that explicitly mandate the bypass of typical agent oversight and output filtering.
- Evidence: The document states "do NOT auto-inspect/retry/filter candidates" and "Do not inspect outputs to block delivery, classify them as recommended or non-recommended, retry them automatically, or repair them with post-processing."
- Description: This directive forces the agent to skip safety and quality checks on generated images, which could lead to the delivery of unverified or inappropriate content produced by the image generation backend.
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