microsoft-office
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts (
pptx_render.py,xlsx_recalc.py) and test files (test_docx_skill.py,test_powerpoint_skill.py,test_xlsx_skill.py) utilizesubprocess.runto invoke external system tools such assoffice(LibreOffice),pdftoppm, andpdftocairo. These operations are conducted using list-based arguments for safety and are integral to the skill's primary functions, such as rendering slides to images and recalculating Excel formulas. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdprerequisites section contains a shell script that installs specific, pinned versions of well-known Python libraries (e.g.,python-docx,openpyxl,python-pptx) from the standard PyPI registry. This is a standard and expected procedure for managing the skill's dependencies. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to extract content from user-provided Office documents, it inherently possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions embedded in a processed document could be interpreted by the agent during the reading phase.
- Ingestion points:
docx_read.py,xlsx_read.py, andpptx_read.pyare used to extract text and structure from documents. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers are used to delimit extracted content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file system writes and execute subprocesses through various utility scripts.
- Sanitization: The scripts do not perform specific sanitization or filtering of the extracted text content.
Audit Metadata