telephony
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves external content from SMS messages and call transcripts that may contain adversarial instructions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Incoming SMS messages are fetched via the
_twilio_inboxfunction inscripts/telephony.py. Call transcripts are retrieved via_bland_statusand_vapi_statusinscripts/telephony.pyafter AI-driven calls are completed. \n - Boundary markers: The script does not wrap retrieved content in protective delimiters or provide explicit instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including sending SMS/MMS, initiating automated outbound calls, and purchasing phone numbers. \n
- Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation is performed on the retrieved message bodies or transcripts before they are provided to the agent context. \n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transmission of sensitive credentials to external service providers as part of its integration features. \n
- Evidence: The
vapi-import-twiliocommand inscripts/telephony.pyreads the user's Twilio Account SID and Auth Token and transmits them to the Vapi API (api.vapi.ai) to enable number integration. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local Python helper script that interacts with the user's environment and filesystem. \n - Evidence: The skill instructions prompt the agent to execute
scripts/telephony.pyusing the Python interpreter to manage credentials and telephony state in the${HERMES_HOME}/.envandtelephony_state.jsonfiles.
Audit Metadata