dotnet-library-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's search workflow pipes the output of a network request directly into a
python3interpreter. This pattern is a recognized attack vector, as a compromise of the remote server could lead to arbitrary code execution if the input is not strictly controlled. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches search results and documentation content from
context7.comusingcurl. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Utilizes
python3 -cto execute an inline script defined in the skill instructions to parse JSON data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Relies on system commands (
curl,python3) to perform its primary documentation retrieval tasks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation suggests that users or agents install an MCP server using
npx -y @upstash/context7-mcp, which downloads and executes remote code from the npm registry at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted documentation content from an external API and presents it to the agent, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External API responses from
context7.comcontaining documentation and search results (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate the external documentation content from the agent's primary instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for shell command execution (
curl,python3) which could be abused if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content fetched from the remote API.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://context7.com/api/v1/search?query=polly - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata