nv-park-and-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading the output of
git show <BASE_SHA>(the diff of a specific commit) and pasting it into the prompt for athermo-nuclear-code-quality-reviewsubagent. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded within the code under review (e.g., in comments or strings) could influence the subagent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to paste the committed diff fromgit show <BASE_SHA>into a prompt template for a subagent. - Boundary markers: The diff is delimited using markdown code blocks (```diff), but there are no specific instructions telling the subagent to ignore any instructions found within the code content itself.
- Capability inventory: While the subagent is marked
readonly: true, the primary agent executing this skill has full file system write access and git execution privileges. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of the diff content before it is processed by the subagent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell command templates that incorporate variables like
<branch>,<BASE_SHA>, and<scope>. If these variables are derived from untrusted sources (such as a branch name containing shell metacharacters like;or&&), it could lead to arbitrary command execution when the agent runs thegit worktree addorgit commitcommands. - Evidence: The workflow uses
git worktree add -b review/<branch>-<BASE_SHA:0:7> ../review-<BASE_SHA:0:7> <BASE_SHA>andgit commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF' refactor(<scope>): ... EOF )".
Audit Metadata