geo-optimizer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command using find to locate its reference documentation at runtime.
  • Evidence: The script in SKILL.md searches through multiple paths including ~/.claude/plugins, ~/.claude/skills, and ~/.codex/skills.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The discovery mechanism targets hidden and potentially sensitive directories used by the AI agent platform to store plugins and skills, which could lead to unauthorized discovery of other installed extensions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in references/geo-techniques.md directs users to clone and execute code from third-party GitHub repositories (github.com/AI2HU/gego and github.com/jonradoff/llmopt). These sources are not associated with the skill author or a trusted vendor list.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted content via WebFetch or file system access and processing it alongside its own logic.
  • Ingestion points: URL content fetched via WebFetch or local files read at Step 3.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt templates to distinguish between instructions and untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (find) and network operations (WebFetch).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of external content is mentioned before processing.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 13, 2026, 03:22 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — geo-optimizer