skills/npc-live/clawfirm/dev/Gen Agent Trust Hub

dev

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains an instruction to execute a local shell script at a fixed file path when specific trigger phrases are detected.
  • File: SKILL.md
  • Evidence: whipflow_run(mode="execute", source="let r = session \\"运行 /Users/qing/projects/pi-go/scripts/selftest.sh 并报告结果\\"")
  • Concern: The instruction specifies mode="execute" and explicitly tells the agent to execute directly ("直接执行"), which bypasses the preview and confirmation step defined in the skill's general execution rules.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data and interpolates it into the execution source of a powerful automation tool.
  • Ingestion points: User instructions for coding, debugging, or refactoring are captured and passed into the whipflow_run tool via the source parameter.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the user-provided text.
  • Capability inventory: The whipflow_run tool has the capability to execute complex workflows, run shell commands via the session keyword, and modify the local codebase.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before the user input is used to construct the dynamic execution script.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 06:06 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — dev