dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains an instruction to execute a local shell script at a fixed file path when specific trigger phrases are detected.
- File:
SKILL.md - Evidence:
whipflow_run(mode="execute", source="let r = session \\"运行 /Users/qing/projects/pi-go/scripts/selftest.sh 并报告结果\\"") - Concern: The instruction specifies
mode="execute"and explicitly tells the agent to execute directly ("直接执行"), which bypasses the preview and confirmation step defined in the skill's general execution rules. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data and interpolates it into the execution source of a powerful automation tool.
- Ingestion points: User instructions for coding, debugging, or refactoring are captured and passed into the
whipflow_runtool via thesourceparameter. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the user-provided text.
- Capability inventory: The
whipflow_runtool has the capability to execute complex workflows, run shell commands via thesessionkeyword, and modify the local codebase. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before the user input is used to construct the dynamic execution script.
Audit Metadata