whipflow
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's core function is to generate .whip DSL scripts and execute them using the
whipflow_runtool. Instructions explicitly mandate usingmode="auto"to run generated scripts immediately, bypassing user review of the code before it executes on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The DSL allows agents within a workflow to utilize highly privileged tools including
bash. This enables the execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host environment as part of an automated pipeline. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Canvas Integration' feature uses
window.parent.postMessagewith a wildcard*target origin. This is a security anti-pattern that allows any parent window or frame to intercept potentially sensitive workflow data or trigger arbitrary workflow execution if the environment is not strictly isolated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection. External data retrieved via the
web_searchorreadtools is directly interpolated into agent prompts using string templates (e.g.,{result},{research}) without sanitization, boundary markers, or instructions to ignore embedded commands. This allows untrusted content from the internet or local files to hijack the workflow's logic. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The workflow allows reading sensitive files (via the
readtool) and subsequently performing network operations (viaweb_searchorbash), creating a direct path for data harvesting and exfiltration.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata