orca-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to "re-run it with escalated permissions" if it encounters a
runtime_access_deniederror, which is a direct instruction to bypass security sandbox restrictions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses
ORCA skills get orca-clito load a "version-matched guide" into the agent's context. This guide contains instructions that the agent is told to follow, creating an attack surface where the tool's output can control the agent's future actions. - Ingestion points: The output of the
ORCA skills get orca-clicommand is loaded as the primary guide inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the loaded guide as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The
orcatool description indicates it can manage terminals, repositories, automations, and an embedded browser. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched guide is performed before the agent acts on its instructions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational logic is not fully contained in the provided file; it dynamically loads its primary instructional body ("the guide") from the
orcaexecutable at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various CLI binaries (
orca,orca-dev,orca-ide) and environment-variable-defined commands (ORCA_CLI_COMMAND) based on environment variables and local path detection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata