canon-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
gh pr view <NUMBER>andgh pr diff <NUMBER>) using a PR number or URL provided by the user. This design creates a command injection vulnerability where a malicious input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|) could lead to the execution of arbitrary commands in the agent's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data from GitHub Pull Requests (titles, descriptions, and code diffs) via the
ghtool. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the PR could manipulate the agent's review process or verdict. - Ingestion points: Pull Request data fetched through
gh pr viewandgh pr diffin the shell-based Phase 0. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or instructional guardrails to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the fetched PR content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses broad capabilities including
Bash,Read,Edit,Write, andGlobtools. - Sanitization: The instructions provide no guidance on sanitizing or validating the external PR content before evaluation.
Audit Metadata