competitive-matrix
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a self-contained HTML file (
/tmp/matrix.html) that includes JavaScript for sorting and filtering logic. It then uses Chrome DevTools (mcp__chrome-devtools__new_page,navigate_page) to execute and render this generated file. This pattern involves the runtime generation and execution of code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Untrusted data is ingested from external websites via
WebSearchand interpolated directly into theDATAsection of the JavaScript template inTEMPLATE.mdwithout explicit sanitization or escaping instructions. A malicious actor could embed payloads in search results (e.g., in product reviews or documentation) that, if incorporated into the matrix's verdict or dimension cells, could attempt to influence the agent's behavior or execute scripts in the rendering browser. - Ingestion points: Untrusted content from external websites via
WebSearchresults. - Boundary markers: The skill provides structural instructions but lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to sanitize/escape data interpolated into the HTML/JS template.
- Capability inventory: Capabilities include file writing (
Write), network access (WebSearch), and browser automation/rendering (chrome-devtoolstools). - Sanitization: No sanitization or HTML-escaping logic is implemented for the external research data placed into the HTML template.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes browser automation tools to interact with and render locally generated files. While these tools are listed in
allowed-tools, their use to render files containing untrusted external data increases the risk profile of the skill's execution environment.
Audit Metadata