deep-debug
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 1 (Evidence Gathering) and Phase 4 (Probes), the skill collects raw stack traces, system logs, git history, and the results of arbitrary shell commands, which are then written to an
evidence.mdfile. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates (e.g.,
hypothesis.user.md,judge-pass1.user.md) interpolate this evidence data directly into the agent's context without using protective delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings. - Capability inventory: The workflow spawns subagents with high-privilege capabilities, including the ability to edit files and execute shell commands (e.g., the
fix-workerinworkflow.pyusestools_needed=True). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly avoids sanitizing or summarizing external data, recording raw output verbatim in the evidence logs.
Audit Metadata