deep-plan
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdandSKILL.md.dspy-optimizedfiles contain instructions that direct the agent to execute a shell command using theBashtool. The user-providedtaskargument is interpolated directly into this command string inside single quotes. This pattern is vulnerable to shell command injection if the user input contains single quotes (e.g., "' ; malicious_command ; '"), allowing for arbitrary code execution on the host machine. - Evidence (SKILL.md):
command="sagaflow launch deep-plan --arg task='<TASK>' --arg max_iter=<N> --arg sdd_dir='<SDD_DIR>' --arg spec='<SPEC_FILE>' --await". - Evidence (SKILL.md.dspy-optimized):
command="sagaflow launch deep-plan --arg task='<TASK>' --arg max_iter=<N> --await". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data (the task description) and processes it through multiple autonomous subagents (Planner, Architect, Critic). This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in a task could potentially influence the planning loop's behavior or outcomes.
- Ingestion points:
taskargument defined inSKILL.mdandSKILL.md.dspy-optimized. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when interpolating the task content into subagent prompts in
workflow.py. - Capability inventory: The
DeepPlanWorkflowusesspawn_subagent,write_artifact,emit_finding, anddeliver_artifact_to_slackacross its implementation. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the task content is performed before it is passed to the subagent prompts in
workflow.py.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata