dora-lite-report
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions allow for shell command injection by interpolating the
{scribe_base_url}and{app}variables directly into acurlcommand. If these variables contain shell metacharacters, they would be executed in the environment. Evidence:curl -s "https://{scribe_base_url}/metrics?app={app}&window=90d"in Phase 1 of theSKILL.mdworkflow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources to generate the "Trend Context" narrative section of the report, creating a surface for prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from a configurable Scribe DORA API and various Spinnaker tools (
delivery:delivery-spinnaker,delivery:delivery-managed-delivery,delivery:delivery-execution-failure-analysis). - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded in the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the shell (
curl) and deployment management tools (delivery:*). - Sanitization: None. The instructions do not specify any validation, filtering, or escaping of the fetched JSON data before it is interpreted by the LLM.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses a user-configurable base URL (
scribe_base_url) for its metrics API. If set to an attacker-controlled endpoint, the skill would exfiltrate application names and deployment statistics to that external server via thecurlcommand.
Audit Metadata