gap-finder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to spawn an interactive shell to execute a specific tool command.
- Evidence: In
DEEP-DFS.md, Section 6, the agent is directed to usezsh -ic 'codex exec "$(cat /tmp/prompt.txt)" < /dev/null > /tmp/out.md 2>&1'to interact with another model tier. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by consuming untrusted content from the open web to influence its validation and 'kill' logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill searches and parses content from Google, GitHub, npm, PyPI, ProductHunt, Stack Overflow, and Reddit as part of its 'kill chain' validation (documented in
VALIDATION.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content are mentioned.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the local file system (e.g.,
gap-finder-state.md,/tmp/out.md) and execute shell commands via thecodexinterface. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external data before it is processed by the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the runtime execution of an external node-based script (
codex) that is not distributed with the skill itself, relying on local environment configurations such asnvmand custom shell aliases. - Evidence: Referenced in
DEEP-DFS.mdunder the Codex section as a required component for the 'Deep Mode' adversarial cross-attack.
Audit Metadata