sprint-retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from multiple external systems, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from GitHub (PRs, commits), Slack (public channels), Jira/Confluence (tickets, project docs), and Google Docs as detailed in
DATA-SOURCES.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of clear boundary markers or delimiters (such as XML tags) to isolate untrusted external content when processing it or including it in the final report.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
ghCLI tool (subprocess) and file system write permissions for producing the retrospective reports and thesprint-retro-evidence.jsonfile. It also supports parallel agent spawning for data gathering tasks. - Sanitization: Although
PRIVACY.mdoutlines a '5-gate privacy checklist' for filtering sensitive keywords and PII, the skill lacks specific sanitization or filtering for instructional patterns or command injections within the retrieved data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the local environment using the GitHub CLI tool to fetch repository data.
- Evidence:
DATA-SOURCES.mdspecifies the use ofgh pr listandgh apito gather information on PRs and user activity. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the transfer of gathered information to an external cloud storage service.
- Evidence:
FORMAT.mdstates that the HTML version of the generated report is uploaded to Amazon S3 as part of its standard delivery workflow.
Audit Metadata