open-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
gitandghCLI tools to synchronize branches and create pull requests. These are standard operations for a development skill. Specifically, it executesgit fetch,git merge, andgh pr createusing explicit arguments derived from repository metadata. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data—specifically git commit messages, branch names, repository issue trackers, and PR templates—to construct a pull request body. This represents an attack surface where malicious data in a commit message or issue description could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the 'Build the PR body' phase.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from
git branch -r,git diff, commit history (origin/<base-branch>...HEAD), and repository files likepull_request_template.mdor.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE/. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a temporary file (
--body-file) to handle the PR content rather than passing it directly as a shell argument, which mitigates simple command injection but does not isolate the LLM from the content itself. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
git,gh) and write to the filesystem (creating the PR body file). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly warn the agent to 'never invent an issue number' and to 'resolve issue relationships from evidence,' which provides a behavioral constraint against hallucination or obedience to injected instructions, though it lacks technical sanitization (e.g., escaping markdown).
Audit Metadata