d365
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
/d365 searchcommand interpolates user-provided keywords directly into a Python string literal within apython3 -cshell command. This enables an attacker to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Python or shell code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple commands, including
/d365 ingest pdf,/d365 ingest dir, and/d365 dump, use unsanitized user input for file paths and document titles in shell templates. This creates a high risk of command injection through shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Data is collected from external websites via
WebSearchand from user-uploaded documents. 2. Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish data from agent instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute bash scripts and write to the file system. 4. Sanitization: There is no validation or security filtering of external content. Malicious instructions hidden in conference abstracts or ingested files could hijack the agent's behavior during improvement or ingestion cycles. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Advisory outputs are automatically synchronized to the vendor's web dashboard at nukasoft.ai using a local synchronization script.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata