inline-sandcastle
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) by processing untrusted data from external sources. * Ingestion points: The skill fetches issue content (title, body, and comments) using
gh issue view --commentsinSKILL.md. This data is then interpolated into the{{ISSUE}}variable. * Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers, delimiters, or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands when the{{ISSUE}}content is passed to the subagent prompts inprompts/coder.mdandprompts/reviewer.md. * Capability inventory: The subagents have extensive capabilities, including executing shell commands viapnpm testandpnpm typecheck, and performing repository operations withgitandgh(documented inprompts/coder.mdandprompts/reviewer.md). * Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the ingested GitHub content was found. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to run in an 'inline' mode, explicitly bypassing the Docker isolation typically used in sandcastle workflows. It executes shell commands like
pnpm testandgit commitdirectly in the agent's current working environment. This architectural choice increases the security risk associated with the identified indirect prompt injection surface, as malicious code introduced via an issue comment could be executed during the test phase with the same permissions as the agent.
Audit Metadata