gastown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install unversioned executable binaries from an external third-party repository on GitHub (github.com/steveyegge/gastown) using the
go install ...@latestcommand. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Setup instructions include the use of
sudoto install the GitHub CLI (gh) on Linux systems. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill directs the agent to modify the user's shell configuration files (
.bashrcor.zshrc) to ensure the Go binary directory remains in the system PATH across sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The core functionality relies on the agent autonomously executing shell commands for the
gtandbdCLI tools, explicitly instructing the agent to bypass user interaction and confirmation for these operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection: 1. Ingestion points: External data enters through
gt rig add(cloning GitHub repositories),gt mail(inter-agent messaging), andgt peek(monitoring output from other agents). 2. Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in external content. 3. Capability inventory: Extensive capabilities including shell command execution, file system modification, and network operations. 4. Sanitization: Lacks mechanisms to validate or filter the content of processed repositories, issues, or agent messages.
Audit Metadata