deep-research-pro

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md (Step 4) direct the agent to execute a shell command curl -sL "<url>" where the URL is dynamic and sourced from external search results. A malicious search result could provide a URL containing shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipes), leading to arbitrary command execution on the host system when interpolated into the command string.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves fetching raw data from external, untrusted web sources and piping it directly into a Python interpreter (python3 -c) for processing. While the provided inline Python script is intended for text extraction, piping unvalidated remote content into an interpreter environment creates a significant security risk if the input is manipulated.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core functionality of processing external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches full-page text content from arbitrary URLs found via DuckDuckGo (Step 4 in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to the agent to treat the fetched content as untrusted or to ignore instructions embedded within that content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network requests via curl, and write files to the filesystem (mkdir and report saving in Step 6).
  • Sanitization: The skill performs only basic regex-based HTML tag removal; it lacks any mechanism to sanitize the semantic content of the fetched text to prevent it from influencing the agent's logic or synthesis process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 22, 2026, 10:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — deep-research-pro