kermt-monitor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions suggest the use of a replay command stored in the cmd_replay field of the run.json manifest file (e.g., $(jq -r .cmd_replay $MANIFEST)). This encourages the execution of arbitrary commands defined in an external, potentially untrusted file.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow uses shell command templates like docker logs -f $container_name and ls -1t $logs_dir/*.log where the variables are sourced from user input or external files. The lack of explicit sanitization or validation for these variables creates a risk of shell command injection if they contain metacharacters.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and summarizes data from training logs and result CSVs which could contain adversarial content intended to mislead the agent.
  • Ingestion points: run.json, *.log files, and test_result.csv.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided to the agent for processing these file contents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to docker commands, file system navigation (ls), and file reading utilities (tail).
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not require the agent to sanitize or escape the content of the logs or manifest fields before using them in summaries or output tables.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 01:05 PM