kermt-monitor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions suggest the use of a replay command stored in the
cmd_replayfield of therun.jsonmanifest file (e.g.,$(jq -r .cmd_replay $MANIFEST)). This encourages the execution of arbitrary commands defined in an external, potentially untrusted file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow uses shell command templates like
docker logs -f $container_nameandls -1t $logs_dir/*.logwhere the variables are sourced from user input or external files. The lack of explicit sanitization or validation for these variables creates a risk of shell command injection if they contain metacharacters. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and summarizes data from training logs and result CSVs which could contain adversarial content intended to mislead the agent.
- Ingestion points:
run.json,*.logfiles, andtest_result.csv. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided to the agent for processing these file contents.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
dockercommands, file system navigation (ls), and file reading utilities (tail). - Sanitization: The instructions do not require the agent to sanitize or escape the content of the logs or manifest fields before using them in summaries or output tables.
Audit Metadata