nooa-self-extending
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'SkillWriting' mechanism where the agent generates Python code, saves it to a persistent
libs/directory, and hot-reloads it into the active process usingself.libs.reload. This allows for the execution of arbitrary logic authored by the LLM during a session. Although mitigated by linting (e.g., E001 for forbidden builtins), the agent maintains the capacity to modify its own runtime environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires
nemo.shellto perform filesystem operations. The agent usesself.shell.writeandself.shell.editto manage the code lifecycle of its persistent libraries, granting it direct control over local files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
@slash_commandfunctionality creates a feedback loop where the command's return value is automatically treated as a new user message or prompt, which could be exploited if the command processes untrusted data. - Ingestion points: Arguments passed to
@slash_commandand the return string of the command function. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the returned prompt content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can utilize
self.shellfor file manipulation andself.libsfor dynamic code loading. - Sanitization: While library reloading involves linting for forbidden imports, the slash command return path lacks explicit sanitization or filtering before the content is re-ingested as a prompt.
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