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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to scan sensitive shell profile and environment files (including
~/.zshrc,~/.zshenv,~/.zprofile,~/.profile,~/.bashrc,~/.bash_profile, and.env*) for exported credentials. While this is part of a security best practice to avoid users pasting secrets into the chat, reading these files exposes local system configuration data to the agent context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses theBashtool to performgrepoperations on local configuration files and to executecurlcommands for probing user-provided backend URLs to verify connectivity.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input which is then used to influence command execution and downstream skill handoffs.\n - Ingestion points: Search queries and environment variable names provided by the user in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions when passing user data to the
/searchskill.\n - Capability inventory: Accesses the file system and network via the
Bashtool and can trigger other skills via theSkilltool.\n - Sanitization: Implements an "indirect credentials" pattern by requiring variable names rather than raw secrets, which prevents sensitive tokens from being recorded in the prompt history.
Audit Metadata