tao-finetune-cosmos-embed
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and action configurations include a command to dynamically install a specific version of a library (
pip install "protobuf<7") within the container environment to resolve a version incompatibility between components. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A troubleshooting script in the documentation uses
torch.load()withweights_only=Falseto verify adapter training status on a locally generated checkpoint file. This performs unsafe deserialization of pickle data, which is a standard but technically insecure practice in ML development. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied dataset metadata files (e.g.,
msrvtt_test_1k.json,labels.json) which contain free-form text captions. This represents a surface where malicious instructions in the training data could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Metadata files are read as inputs for training, evaluation, and inference via the
cosmos-embed1CLI. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when processing the caption text.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
cosmos-embed1CLI tool and has the ability to perform dynamic package installations. - Sanitization: The documentation does not describe any sanitization or validation of the text content within the ingested metadata files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill pulls a container image from NVIDIA's NGC registry and downloads model weights from Hugging Face. Both are well-known and vendor-controlled sources.
Audit Metadata