tao-finetune-nv-tesseract-forecasting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
perform_forecastingfunction and fine-tuning scripts load data normalization statistics from.pklfiles (e.g.,standardizer.pkl). Python'spicklemodule, typically used to handle these files, can execute arbitrary code during deserialization. While the skill defaults to downloading these from a trusted repository on Hugging Face, it also supports loading local files (e.g., fromartifacts/) that could be untrusted. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted time-series data from CSV files.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via
pd.read_csvand CLI flags like--csvor--train-csvacross multiple files includingSKILL.mdandreferences/automl.md. - Boundary markers: There are no documented delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for shell command execution (via
uv run), file writing to the local system, and network access to Hugging Face. - Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of data validation or sanitization before the CSV content is processed by the model or used in downstream scripts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically fetches model checkpoints (
.pt) and standardizers (.pkl) from the officialnvidia/nv-tesseract-forecastingrepository on Hugging Face. This operation targets a well-known service and a trusted organization, representing standard functionality for obtaining pretrained model weights.
Audit Metadata