tao-finetune-video-clip
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data that is interpolated into the model's context, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Metadata JSON files (
train.json,val.json) and text files (prompts.txt) as described inSKILL.mdand referenced in YAML spec templates. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not prescribe the use of delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the metadata or prompt files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including
docker runexecution with host network and GPU access, and the ability to write result files to the local file system. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the content within the JSON caption fields or text prompt files is mentioned.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes high-privilege shell commands to manage the AI training environment.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddefinesDOCKER_COMMONflags including--gpus all,--ipc=host, and--network=host, which grant the container extensive access to host resources. These are standard for NVIDIA TAO high-performance training but represent a high-capability execution environment. - Evidence: The environment variable
TORCH_FORCE_NO_WEIGHTS_ONLY_LOAD=1is explicitly set to bypass the default security behavior in PyTorch 2.6+ that restricts loading non-safe pickle objects, which is required for compatibility with certain TAO checkpoints. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill and its evaluation configuration download resources from established vendor and service domains.
- Evidence: Fetches container images from NVIDIA's official registry at
nvcr.io. - Evidence: The evaluation config (
eval.config) usess5cmdto mirror datasets and models from an internal NVIDIA S3 endpoint (pdx.s8k.io).
Audit Metadata