tao-mine-od-images
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent to execute shell commands, including running Docker containers and local Python validation scripts. The YAML frontmatter explicitly permits
Bashtool usage for these operations. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The recommended
docker runcommand utilizes--ipc=hostand--network=hostflags, which reduce container isolation to allow shared memory access and host networking, typical for high-performance GPU tasks. Additionally, the documentation advises against specifying a non-root user ID (--user $(id -u):$(id -g)) because specific TAO toolkit images require the UID to be present in the container's/etc/passwdto function correctly. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a Docker container image from
nvcr.io/nvidia/tao/tao-toolkit, which is the official NVIDIA Container Registry. These downloads are associated with the official vendor and the primary purpose of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied Parquet embedding files and YAML configuration specs. An attack surface exists if these inputs contain malicious content.
- Ingestion points: YAML configuration file (
--spec) and Parquet data files (source_path,target_path). - Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the prompt interpolation, but the skill relies on rigid tool-based execution.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via Docker and write to the local filesystem (output directory).
- Sanitization: The included script
scripts/verify_unique_neighbor_matching_spec.pyperforms schema and value validation on the YAML configuration usingyaml.safe_load()and strict type checking before execution.
Audit Metadata