tao-prepare-anomalygennext-inputs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_anomalygennext_amp.pyinvokes the containerizedroi_placetool usingsubprocess.run. This is the intended primary functionality of the skill and is implemented using safe practices, including the use of argument lists instead of shell strings to prevent command injection, and setting environment variables likeHF_HUB_OFFLINEandTRANSFORMERS_OFFLINEto prevent unauthorized network access during runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from
gap_parquetanddefect_spec.jsonlfiles inscripts/prepare_anomalygennext_inputs.py. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the
roi_prompt_defect_locationtext prompt. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute commands via
subprocess.runinscripts/run_anomalygennext_amp.pybased on the processed configuration. - Sanitization: The skill performs basic presence validation for required fields but does not implement content-based sanitization or filtering for potential injection patterns in the user-supplied prompts.
Audit Metadata