tao-train-depth-anything-v2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches pretrained DINOv2 model weights from Meta's official public storage domain. This is an expected behavior for a machine learning skill to load necessary foundation model backbones.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Generates and instructs the agent to execute
docker runanddepth_netCLI operations. These commands are fundamental to the skill's primary purpose of model training, evaluation, and inference. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-provided datasets and configuration files.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through user-supplied annotation files and configuration spec overrides defined in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Explicit boundary markers or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are absent in the documentation for user-provided data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages the
Bashtool to executedockerand training commands across its scripts. - Sanitization: Input validation relies on the internal parsing and schema validation logic of the TAO Toolkit CLI tools.
Audit Metadata