tao-train-oneformer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and downloads pretrained model weights from the SwinTransformer GitHub repository (Microsoft Research). This is a well-known and reputable source for computer vision research artifacts used to initialize model training.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the
Bashtool to execute TAO Toolkit commands (e.g.,oneformer train,oneformer evaluate) anddocker runsequences. These operations are essential for the skill's purpose and are documented to occur within scoped container environments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a potential surface for indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent context ingests untrusted data from dataset annotation files (JSON) and user-provided image directories, as well as configuration YAML files (referenced in
SKILL.mdandreferences/skill_info.yaml). - Boundary markers: Explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in dataset files are absent.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via the
Bashtool (references/skill_info.yaml). - Sanitization: Input validation is expected to be performed by the
oneformerCLI tool and TAO Toolkit libraries within the official NVIDIA container environment.
Audit Metadata