tao-train-pose-classification
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Ingests external skeleton data files (.npy and .pkl) and DeepStream JSON files during training, evaluation, and inference as specified in
SKILL.mdandreferences/skill_info.yaml.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or explicit boundary markers to isolate the processed data from agent instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executedocker runcommands and TAO CLI operations.\n - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or content validation procedures for the ingested dataset files are described in the agent instructions.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a Docker container image from a remote registry to execute its core functions.\n
- Evidence: The skill pulls the TAO toolkit image
nvcr.io/nvstaging/tao/tao-toolkit-pyt:7.2.0-rc-36-multiarchfrom NVIDIA's registry as part of its standard workflow defined inSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata