tao-train-sparse4d
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/normalize_depth_paths.pyperforms unsafe deserialization of local data. - Evidence: The
normalize_ann_filefunction callspickle.load(handle)on user-provided.pklfiles. - Risk: The
picklemodule is known to be insecure as it can execute arbitrary code during the loading process. If an attacker can provide a malicious.pklfile, they could achieve code execution on the user's system. - Remediation: Replace
picklewith a safer format like JSON for annotation files, or use a library that provides secure deserialization. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through processed data.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/normalize_depth_paths.pyscript ingests data from.pklfiles provided via command-line arguments. - Boundary markers: The instructions and processing script do not use boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the processed annotation content.
- Capability inventory: The script has the ability to write files to the filesystem using
pickle.dump()inscripts/normalize_depth_paths.py. - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the contents of the annotation files before they are processed and written back.
- Remediation: Implement strict schema validation for all ingested data and add delimiters when interpolating data into prompts.
Audit Metadata