tao-train-sparse4d
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The utility script
scripts/normalize_depth_paths.pyusespickle.load()to deserialize annotation files. - The
picklemodule is notoriously insecure as it can be used to execute arbitrary code during the unpickling process. - The script accepts file paths as command-line arguments and proceeds to load them using
pickle, creating a direct path for code execution if an agent is tricked into running the script against a malicious file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an ingestion surface for potentially untrusted data that could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/normalize_depth_paths.pyreads data from.pklannotation files provided via command-line arguments. - Boundary markers: The script does not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to the AI to ignore embedded content within these data files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read and write files and execute local Python scripts. The deserialization process itself provides a mechanism for arbitrary code execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the data retrieved from
pickle.load()before it is processed or written back to disk.
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